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Human dignity and the future of the 
voluntary active euthanasia debate in 
South Africa
To the Editor: In this letter, I reply to Dr Donkin’s[1] response to 
my article ‘Human dignity and the future of the voluntary active 
euthanasia debate in South Africa’,[2] published in the May 2017 
edition of the SAMJ.
I start with the question of whether individual autonomy is central 
to the definition of human dignity. Although the concept of human 
dignity has near-universal appeal, internationally several conceptions 
of its meaning exist. In South Africa (SA), our Constitutional 
Court has over the past generation often grappled with the concept 
in its jurisprudence. In the case of Barkhuizen v Napier,[3] the 
Constitutional Court explicitly held that ‘Self-autonomy, or the 
ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is 
the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity.’ This position 
was echoed in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay,[4] where 
the majority of the Constitutional Court held that an ‘entitlement to 
respect for the unique set of ends that the individual pursues’ – which 
approximates to autonomy – is a ‘necessary element of freedom and 
of dignity of any individual’. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held as follows in British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Minister of Health:[5]
 ‘Recognising the role of freedom of expression in asserting the 
moral autonomy of individuals demonstrates the close links 
between freedom of expression and other constitutional rights 
such as human dignity, privacy and freedom. Underlying all 
these constitutional rights is the constitutional celebration of the 
possibility of morally autonomous human beings independently 
able to form opinions and act on them.’
Accordingly, there is solid authority for my proposition that, in SA 
law, individual autonomy is central to human dignity. Dr Donkin’s 
accusation that so-called ‘pro-euthanasia activists’ frequently ‘hijack’ 
dignity and use it as a ‘euphemism’ for autonomy is therefore without 
merit. In our law, autonomy needs no euphemism – it is explicitly 
celebrated as a vital part of human dignity. This is the reality that will 
have to be confronted in any subsequent litigation about voluntary 
active euthanasia.
Next, Dr Donkin states that ‘Jordaan failed to mention that indi-
vidual autonomy can never be absolute.’ This is not correct. I clearly 
stated in my article that human dignity, and per implication therefore 
individual autonomy, are not the only relevant considerations in the 
voluntary active euthanasia debate. In fact, I concluded my article 
by stating that ‘It bears repetition that human dignity is not the 
only right that is relevant to this complex discourse. The question of 
whether or not voluntary active euthanasia is required by SA’s human 
rights system must be answered by carefully balancing all rights that 
are relevant to the subject.’ The balancing of rights is a standard 
principle of our law that goes without saying.
The term ‘autonomy’ is used, with somewhat different meanings, 
in fields as diverse as law and psychology, and one must be careful to 
avoid conflating these different uses. In particular, questions of free 
will must be distinguished from the legal meaning of autonomy. John 
Stuart Mill refers to this very distinction in the first sentence of On 
Liberty[6] (in somewhat old-fashioned language): ‘The subject of 
this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately 
opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but 
Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which 
can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.’ As such, 
when I propose that autonomy is a central component of human 
dignity, I am making a legal claim that the constitutional right to 
dignity entails the right of individuals to self-determination.
On a practical level, Dr Donkin mentions the possibility of abuse of 
sick persons. The possibility for abuse exists in many areas of the law, 
but does not constitute a good reason for blanket prohibitions. The 
proper way to address foreseeable abuse in the context of voluntary 
active euthanasia is by putting legal safeguards in place. In surrogacy, 
for instance, the legal safeguards against abuse include, among others, 
that any surrogacy agreement must be approved by the High Court 
before it is put into effect.
Lastly, Dr Donkin contends that I lose sight of the ‘human 
consequences’ of euthanasia. Is the vindication – or violation! – of a 
person’s dignity not a ‘human consequence’?
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